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Abstract 
 
We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral 
firm-worker bargaining setting, we find that the introduction of a minimum wage exerts 
upward pressure on wages even if the minimum wage is too low to be a binding restriction. 
Furthermore, raising the minimum wage to a binding level increases the bargained wage 
above the new minimum wage level. While the Nash solution cannot explain the existence of 
spillover effects, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields results that are qualitatively more in 
line with our experimental findings. 
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1.  Introduction 
A central concern in labor economics is to understand the social consequences of minimum 
wages. The general question whether a minimum wage should be introduced or increased is 
much debated. A recurring issue in this discussion is the magnitude of so-called spillover ef-
fects. Although only a relatively small percentage of the workforce will gain directly from the 
introduction of, or a rise in, the minimum wage, there is substantial empirical evidence that 
minimum wages have spillover effects, i.e. that they exert upward pressure on wages higher 
up in the wage distribution (Card and Krueger 1995, Katz and Krueger 1992). 
A number of empirical studies have addressed the issue of spillover effects of minimum 
wages.
1
Two important stylized facts on spillover effects of minimum wages emerge from the em-
pirical literature: 
 Grossman (1983) shows that an increase in the minimum wage increases the wages of 
occupations above the new minimum wage, at least in the short run. Katz and Krueger (1992) 
study the effect of the increase in the US federal minimum wage on fast-food restaurants in 
Texas. They find that about one-third of surveyed restaurants reacted to the minimum wage 
increase by maintaining their wage hierarchy, which means that the wages of workers who 
used to earn more than the old minimum wage are raised to a level exceeding the new mini-
mum wage. Among firms in which the starting wage was already above the new minimum 
wage, 60 percent reacted to the higher minimum wage by raising their wages even further. 
DiNardo et al. (1996), Lee (1999), and Manning (2003) examine changes in the US distribu-
tion of wages and find evidence of spillover effects above the minimum wage. Neumark et al. 
(2004) estimate the impact of changes in the US minimum wage on the wages of workers 
already earning more than the new minimum. To control for contemporaneous general wage 
growth, they compare workers in states in which the minimum wage was raised to workers at 
the same position in the wage distribution in states in which the minimum wage stayed con-
stant. Their results are indicative of substantial short-run spillovers to higher wage groups. For 
workers with wages close to the new minimum wage, the wage elasticity with respect to the 
minimum wage is 0.8. This elasticity is smaller for higher wage groups, but still amounts to 
0.15 for workers who earn between 1.5 and two times the minimum wage.  
                                                 
1 Comprehensive reviews of the empirical literature on spillover effects of minimum wages are provided by Card 
and Krueger (1995, Ch. 5) and Neumark and Wascher (2008, Ch. 4). Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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1. a substantial number of firms raise the wages of workers that used to earn less than the 
new minimum wage above the minimum level required, and  
2. it seems to be common practice that workers already earning wages above the new min-
imum wage receive wage raises as well. 
The empirically observed spillover effects can occur for a number of reasons and can be 
explained by different theoretical models of the labor market. A first potential explanation 
builds on changes in the relative price of low-skilled labor. If workers have different produc-
tivities, the introduction of a minimum wage might directly affect the wage of low-skilled 
workers. This causes a shift in labor demand since firms will substitute workers with produc-
tivity above the new minimum wage for workers with lower productivities, resulting in higher 
wages for workers who were already better-paid (Pettengill 1981). A second explanation can 
be derived in equilibrium search models with monopsonistic firm behavior. Manning (2003) 
shows that, in a modified Burdett-Mortensen (1998) framework, firms that previously paid 
relatively high wages to attract workers from low-wage firms can – following the introduction 
of a relatively low minimum wage – only hire employees if they increase their wages too. 
Third, spillover effects can arise in efficiency wage models. Grossman (1983) develops a 
model with skilled and unskilled labor in which the effort exerted by skilled workers depends 
on their wage relative to that received by unskilled workers. An increase in the legal mini-
mum wage raises the wages of unskilled workers. The smaller wage differential between 
skilled and unskilled work reduces skilled workers’ effort, so that firms have to increase the 
wage received by higher-paid workers as well.  
All of these theoretical explanations might play a role in explaining spillover effects in 
real labor markets. However, there is substantial evidence that spillover effects are even more 
universal and also occur in situations which cannot be characterized by maintaining an inter-
nal wage hierarchy, ensuring competitive wages compared to other firms, or preserving incen-
tives for effort. In an experimental study by Falk et al. (2006), the aforementioned factors are 
excluded by design. In their laboratory experiment, a rent is shared between participants act-
ing as “workers” and “firms”. Firms set a wage which leads to the creation and distribution of 
a rent if it exceeds the reservation wage set in advance by workers. The introduction of a min-
imum wage affects the labor market equilibrium by raising workers’ reservation wages often 
even above the new minimum. This pushes equilibrium wages above the new minimum as 
well. Similar findings are reported by Brandts and Charness (2004) who show experimentally 
that the introduction of a minimum wage, even if it is non-binding, affects workers’ effort Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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provision negatively. Both experimental studies point to the existence of menu dependence 
(Sen 1997): changes in the range of wages that are potentially attainable for both sides can 
affect the wage determination process even if they were not chosen in equilibrium.  
In this paper, we build on the recent experimental evidence of spillover effects. We con-
duct a laboratory experiment with homogeneous workers and bilateral wage bargaining in 
which a minimum wage is introduced  and subsequently  increased.  Similar to Falk et al. 
(2006), we therefore exclude the standard explanations for spillover effects by our experimen-
tal design. In contrast to Falk et al. (2006), however, the wage in our labor market setting is 
determined by bilateral bargaining between workers and firms.
2 Our experimental results con-
firm the stylized facts known from the empirical literature. First, the introduction of a mini-
mum wage at a low level leads to higher wages even if wages were initially already above the 
minimum wage. Second, raising the minimum wage above the level observed in the absence 
of minimum wages lifts most wages not only to this new minimum, but even higher. Obvious-
ly, these spillover effects cannot be explained by standard wage hierarchies or effort provision 
models since we have explicitly excluded these effects by the design of our experiment. To 
explain our findings, we make use of bargaining theory and compare the effects of minimum 
wages in two well-known bargaining solutions. We show that the commonly used Nash solu-
tion is unable to explain these findings, but the application of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 
can provide a theoretical foundation for the existence of spillover effects.
3
We will proceed as follows. In section 
 Quantitatively, 
however, neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are able to give a sufficiently 
precise description of the actual bargaining outcome. 
2, we present the experimental design. Section 3 
discusses how the introduction of and subsequent increases in the minimum wage affect the 
wage distribution in our bargaining experiment. Section 4 compares the experimental results 
with theoretical bargaining solutions when bargaining follows either the Nash or the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Therewith, we cover the stylized fact that labor markets in many OECD countries are characterized by mini-
mum wages as well as individual or collective wage bargaining. 
3 Dittrich and Knabe (2010) provide an application of this theoretical reasoning in a union bargaining frame-
work. Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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2.  Experimental design 
In this section, we give a brief overview on the related literature on minimum wage experi-
ments. We then describe the experimental design and provide information on the treatments 
and the procedures of our experiment. 
Related literature 
In addition to the empirical observations described above, the impact of minimum wages was 
examined in laboratory experiments. Falk et al. (2006) explore potential driving forces behind 
the observed spillover effects. In their experimental labor market setting, a firm offers a wage 
to  three  potential  employees.  The firm only makes one (non-discriminating)  offer. Each 
worker can either accept or reject the firm’s offer. If the worker accepts, he receives the wage, 
while he receives nothing when rejecting the firm’s offer. Firm’s profit is total revenue minus 
the wages. After each round, all players are informed about both the firm’s and workers’ 
payoffs. Moreover, Falk et al. (2006) used the strategy method to elicit workers’ individual 
acceptance threshold, i. e. the lowest wage offer they would accept. Before workers were in-
formed about the actual wage offer, they had to indicate their reservation wages which re-
mained private information. Workers were then separated into three groups with a high, an 
intermediate and a low reservation wage, respectively. After this, one worker from each group 
was randomly matched with one firm.  
To analyze the impact of minimum wages, Falk et al. (2006) played two different settings. 
In the first setting, there was no minimum wage, while a binding minimum wage was intro-
duced in the second setting. Both settings were played for 15 periods. The majority of wages 
in the first setting was below the level at which the minimum wage was introduced in the 
second setting. Similar to the observations in the empirical literature, the introduction of the 
minimum wage shifted the entire wage structure upwards and lifted most wages above the 
minimum wage level. Falk et al. (2006) argue that the set of feasible alternatives affect work-
ers perception of a fair wage offer and hence their reservation wages. If minimum wages in-
crease the lowest possible wage offer a firm can make, the same offer by the firm might ap-
pear less generous to the worker. For example, a wage offer of EUR 8 per hour might be 
judged as fair in the absence of a minimum wage because the firm could have offered much 
less. If the same offer was made while the minimum wage was at EUR 8 as well, however, 
workers might consider this wage offer as rather unfair. Taking this into account, higher min-Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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imum wages raise reservation wages, which leads firms to offer wages above the minimum 
wage.  
A similar argument can be found in the experimental study of Brandts and Charness 
(2004). They apply a gift exchange game with both variable effort in the labor market and 
variable quality in the goods market. In the labor market, the firm offers a wage whose level 
can be seen as a gift. Afterwards, the workers choose their effort levels, thereby implicitly 
deciding on the extent of the returned gift. The income of the firm consists of its endowment 
minus the wage plus 5 times the effort level. The income of the worker consists of the en-
dowment minus the effort level plus 5 times the wage. In stage one, firms’ offers were written 
on a blackboard and hence were public information. The minimum wage was introduced at a 
level of half of the endowment. Workers had to choose one of the offers made. In stage two, 
each worker wrote his effort level on a prepared form which was only communicated to the 
respective firm. There was no possibility for a worker to reject an offer. After introducing the 
minimum wage, Brandts and Charness (2004) find that effort decreased. Given the same wage 
level workers showed lower effort. Since the introduction of the minimum wage forced firms 
to be more “generous”, their feasible alternatives have been reduced and affected the workers’ 
perception of fairness, and thus their effort levels, negatively. This effect could also be shown 
to arise for very low, non-binding minimum wages. 
Experimental wage negotiations  
In our experiment, a “worker” and a “firm” bargain over the division of a rent. Participants 
are told that the firm is offered a contract by some customer worth 300 experimental currency 
units (“tokens”). To fulfill the contract, it needs to hire a worker. There is only one, currently 
unemployed worker available, with which the firm has to agree on a wage before hiring. The 
rent of 300 tokens can be split between the firm and the worker via bargaining over the work-
er’s wage w. If there is a bargaining agreement, the worker is hired by the firm and the con-
tract is carried out. The worker receives the bargained wage w  and the firm’s profit is 
300 . − w  If bargaining breaks down, the firm is assumed to have some alternative production 
possibility. This outside option, for which employing the worker is not needed, generates a 
payoff of 110 tokens for the firm. The worker stays unemployed and receives nothing, i.e. his 
outside option is assumed to be zero.  
In contrast to Falk et al. (2006) and Brandts and Charness (2004), the wage is determined 
via alternating-offers bargaining (as in Rubinstein 1982). In the first round, the firm offers a Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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wage which can be accepted or rejected by the worker. If the worker accepts the offer, he will 
be hired, the output is produced and the game ends. If the worker rejects, he can make a coun-
teroffer in round 2 which can then be accepted or rejected by the firm. Bargaining is over if an 
offer is accepted in any round or if bargaining breaks down exogenously after an offer has 
been rejected. The probability of such a breakdown is 20 percent for each bargaining round in 
which an offer is rejected. To give the participants the chance to make their first offer and 
counteroffer without having to fear the breakdown of negotiations, rejections could only lead 
to breakdowns after round 3. 
Subjects and procedures 
The experiments were conducted during one day at TU Dresden with a total of 122 partici-
pants. All participants were undergraduate students with various majors. Before the start of 
the experiment, half of the subjects were randomly assigned to the role of a worker and the 
others to the role of a firm. These roles remained fixed for the whole experiment. Each partic-
ipant bargained in 20 separate negotiations (“periods”). The right to make the first offer alter-
nated after a negotiation concluded, i. e. in period 1 the firm made the first offer, in period 2 
the worker made the first offer, and so on. Subjects were randomly matched into bargaining 
pairs (one worker, one firm) in each period and could only sign a wage agreement within their 
respective pair. Participants were randomly re-matched after each period. 
To make sure that the subjects understood the bargaining procedures and the payoff con-
sequences of their actions, each subject was given a detailed set of instructions before the ex-
periment started. The players were asked to read through the written instructions. Afterwards, 
each participant had the possibility to ask questions. These were answered privately by the 
experimenter. No additional questions were answered and any form of uncontrolled commu-
nication was made impossible during the actual experiment. Whenever the players had to act, 
they had to fill out prepared forms. The basic setup was as follows: In round 1, the first player 
offered a wage by entering the offer into the prepared form. Then the form was passed to the 
other player and round 2 started. Now the other player could either put a check mark in a spe-
cific box if he accepts the wage offered or he could enter a new wage in the form. Again the 
form was passed to the first player. This procedure went on until an agreement was reached or 
bargaining broke down. Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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Treatments 
We conducted five treatments directly one after another, where each treatment was played for 
four periods, respectively. In each period, the worker and the firm bargained over the wage 
via alternating offers as described above. The various treatments only differed in the level of 
the legal minimum wage. Treatment 1 (periods 1-4) had no minimum wage, i.e. the range of 
permissible wages was 0 300 w ≤≤ . In treatment 2 (periods 5-8), a minimum wage of 70 to-
kens was introduced. Even though wages below the minimum could be offered, the eventual 
agreement had to obey the wage constraint 70 300 w ≤≤ . Agreements below the minimum 
wage were regarded as breakdowns. However, the minimum wage of 70 was a non-binding 
restriction for almost all wage agreements in setting 1. In treatment 3 (periods 9-12), the min-
imum wage was raised to 95. Again, this minimum was non-binding for most wage agree-
ments in the previous periods. In treatment 4 (periods 13-16), the minimum wage was raised 
to 160 implying a binding restriction for most wage agreements in previous periods. Finally, 
the minimum wage was abolished in treatment 5 (periods 17-20).
4
Payments  
 
The exchange rate between tokens and real money was 50 tokens = EUR 1 (US $ 1.35). 
Hence, the rent which was bargained over in each period by the worker and the firm had a 
value of EUR 6. At the end of the experiment, one out of the four bargaining agreements in 
each treatment was randomly chosen. These agreements were relevant for the payoffs in the 
respective treatment. The experiment lasted approximately 90 minutes and subjects earned on 
average EUR 17.50, including a show-up fee of EUR 6.
5
Hypotheses 
 All participants were paid in cash 
directly after the experiment. 
Based on the stylized facts of the empirical literature described in section 1, we formulate two 
hypotheses to be tested in our experiment: 
Hypothesis 1: The introduction of a non-binding minimum wage will raise the bargained 
wage. 
                                                 
4 Due to time restrictions when conducting the experiment, 30 students participated in treatments 3 to 5 only for 
two instead of four periods. We checked that our results are robust to excluding this group from the analysis and 
also to restricting our analysis to the periods in which all subjects participated. 
5 The comparable market wage for undergraduate students in Dresden is approximately EUR 8 per hour.  Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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Treatment 2 will be most relevant for testing Hypothesis 1. The minimum wage of 70 is be-
low the level of wages that one would expect to see in this experiment even in the absence of 
minimum wages. If we nevertheless detect an impact of such a low, non-binding minimum 
wage on the wage distribution, this can be interpreted as evidence for spillover effects. As we 
will see when we discuss the results, also the minimum wage of 95 (Treatment 3) is too low to 
be a binding restriction for most negotiations. Hence, examining the switch between Treat-
ments 2 and 3 allows to draw conclusions about the existence of spillover effects when raising 
(as compared to introducing) a minimum wage. 
Hypothesis 2: The introduction of a binding minimum wage will raise the wage to a level 
above the minimum wage. 
Treatment 4 serves to test our second hypothesis. The minimum wage of 160 is above the 
wage levels we expect to arise without minimum wages. Hence, it constitutes a binding re-
striction on most negotiations. If actual bargaining outcomes are found above the level of 160 
in this treatment, this would constitute evidence in support of spillover effects of binding min-
imum wages. 
3.  Results 
We now turn to the results of our experiment. In the first subsection, we discuss how the in-
troduction of minimum wages at a relatively low level and subsequent increases in the mini-
mum wage affect the wage distribution arising in our bargaining experiment. This should give 
us a clear indication whether minimum wages have spillover effects or not. In the second sub-
section, we provide further evidence on how the two parties approach the negotiations under 
the presence of minimum wages. In particular, we will analyze how each side’s first offer and 
the respective counteroffer are affected by the minimum wage. This helps to shed light on the 
mechanisms driving the impact of minimum wages on the wage bargain. 
3.1  Minimum wages and the wage distribution 
Table 1 and Figure 1 present descriptive statistics and histograms of the wage distribution in 
the five different treatments. There is no minimum wage in the first treatment. 90% of all bar-
gained wages are in the interval between 100 and 150, which correspond to payoffs for the 
employer between 200 and 150, respectively. The lowest observed wage is 35, the highest is Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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165. The median wage is at 130, the mean wage at 124.40. This corresponds to a median 
payoff of 170 and a mean payoff of 175.54 for the employers. That illustrates that the em-
ployers’ outside option of 110 does not act as a binding constraint on the bargaining outcome, 
but instead improves the employers’ bargaining position and raises their average payoff clear-
ly above the equal-split solution of 150. 
Table 1: Bargaining outcomes 
 
In Treatment 2, a minimum wage of 70 is introduced. Based on the wage distribution of 
Treatment 1, this minimum wage is binding for less than 2 percent of wages. Even though the 
minimum wage of 70 prohibits only very low wage levels that were only very rarely observed 
in Treatment 1, it affects the entire wage distribution. The mean of the wage distribution shifts 
up from 124.40 to 129.93. The wage distribution shifts at the lower and the upper end. The 
25
th percentile increases from 110 to 119, the 75
th percentile from 140 to 145. Due to the con-
centration of bargaining outcomes at prominent numbers, wages at the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th per-
centiles do not change. Figure 1 shows that even though a few negotiations agreed to wages 
below 70 in Treatment 1, even the lowest wage agreement in Treatment 2 is strictly larger 
than the minimum wage.  
10 25
50 
(median)
75 90
1 - 124.40 2.00 100 110 130 140 150
2 70 129.93 2.14 100 119 130 145 150
3 95 134.47 1.85 110 121 139 145 150
4 160 170.43 0.58 161 165 170 175 180
5 - 128.68 2.23 100 115 130 145 150
Note: standard errors clustered at the individual ("employer") level (62 clusters).
treatment
minimum 
wage
mean
s.e. of the 
mean
percentilesSpillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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Figure 1: Wage distribution with and without minimum wages 
  
We conduct various statistical tests to check whether the shift in the wage distribution fol-
lowing the introduction of the minimum wage is statistically significant. As Table 2 shows, a 
t-test of the equality of means shows that mean wages differ significantly between Treatments 
1 and 2 (p < .01).
6
                                                 
6 To take into account that observations within and across treatments are obtained from a limited number of 
participants, we calculated clustered standard errors at the individual level. In about 3% of the negotiations, one 
of the bargaining parties forgot to write their preassigned ID on the negotiation form. We assigned all unknown 
IDs to one cluster, so that we obtained 62 clusters for individuals acting as employers and 62 clusters for em-
ployees. We checked that clustering of standard errors at the level of employers yields qualitatively equivalent 
results to clustering at the level of employees. 
 We also run a linear regression, where we regress bargaining outcomes on 
dummy variables for the five different treatments and add individual fixed effects. The regres-
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sion results also support the claim that mean bargaining outcomes were shifted upwards be-
tween Treatments 1 and 2.
7
Since a few wages in Treatment 1 are below the minimum wage in Treatment 2, the mean 
wage and the wage distribution under both treatments could differ even if there were no spil-
lover effects. It would suffice that these very low wages would be raised to the new minimum 
wage level. When we compare the means and wage distributions of Treatments 1 and 2 and 
exclude all observations in Treatment 1 that were below the new minimum wage of 70 (not 
reported in 
 Since the Shapiro-Wilk-test and the one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-test reject the hypothesis that bargained wages are normally distributed, we also ap-
ply the non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. We calculate mean bar-
gaining outcomes for each participant under each treatment and compare them across Treat-
ments 1 and 2. This test also rejects the hypothesis that the wage distributions under both 
treatments are the same. 
Table 2), the distributions become more similar, but the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test still reject the equality hypothesis (p < .1). 
In Treatment 3, the minimum wage is raised to 95. This minimum wage level is still very 
low relative to the wage distributions observed under Treatments 1 and 2. In Treatment 1, 
only 6 percent of wage negotiations were below this new minimum wage level. Compared to 
Treatment 2, where the minimum wage was already at 70, only 2 percent of the bargaining 
outcomes would be affected by this increase in the minimum wage. Despite its small “bite”, 
the new minimum wage shifts up the entire wage distribution even further. Only one bargain-
ing pair (< 1 percent) ends up at exactly the new minimum wage. The new mean wage is 
134.47. The 10
th and 25
th percentiles and the median of the wage distribution increase com-
pared to Treatment 2. All three statistical tests in Table 2 reject the hypothesis that the wage 
distribution was not affected by the increase in the minimum wage from 70 to 95. 
Table 2: Hypotheses tests concerning bargaining outcomes 
  
                                                 
7 The complete regression results are presented in the Appendix. 
(no further controls)
(controlling for individual 
fixed effects)
Treatment 1 = Treatment 2 0.007 0.046 0.009
Treatment 2 = Treatment 3 0.024 0.008 0.083
Treatment 3 = Treatment 4 0.000 0.000 0.000
Treatment 5 = Treatment 1 0.069 0.166 0.025
mean of Treatment 4 = 160 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: p-values reported, clustering at the individual ("employer") level (62 clusters).
t-test
Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-ranks test
HypothesisSpillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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We raise the minimum wage to 160 in Treatment 4. This level constitutes a binding con-
straint for most bargaining outcomes observed in Treatments 1-3. 99%, 95%, and 95% of ob-
served bargaining outcomes were below the new minimum wage level of 160 in Treatments 1, 
2, and 3, respectively. Figure 1 shows that, at this relatively high minimum wage, bargaining 
outcomes are located in the rather narrow interval between 160 and 185. Despite the fact that 
the vast majority of bargained wages were strictly below the minimum wage before it was 
raised, less than 10% of the bargaining outcomes in Treatment 4 are exactly at 160, and only 
about 15 percent are below 165. The mean, median and the mode of the wage distribution are 
all at about 170. The statistical tests presented in Table 2 also support the hypotheses that the 
wage distribution in Treatment 4 differs significantly from that in Treatment 3 and, more im-
portantly, that its mean and median differ significantly from the minimum wage of 160. This 
suggests that the minimum wage produces strong spillover effects in our experimental bar-
gaining setting. Looking at the wage distribution in Treatment 1, one could expect that a min-
imum wage of 160 would lead to a large spike at exactly 160. Instead, most wages are driven 
strictly above this minimum wage level.  
The results of Treatments 1-4 provide strong evidence that minimum wages cause sub-
stantial spillover effects if wages are bargained over. Even very low minimum wages cause an 
upward shift of the entire wage distribution. We do not observe that minimum wages, not 
even at rather high levels, result in a spike in the distribution at the minimum wage level. This 
suggests that the minimum wage does not simply truncate the wage distribution at the bottom 
end, but instead acts as a lower limit to the interval of wages over which the employer and the 
employee bargain. The actual bargaining outcome is found somewhere inside this interval, 
such that the minimum wage occurs only rarely as a bargaining outcome. We will return to 
this point later. 
In Treatment 5, we abolish the minimum wage again. A quick glance at Figure 1 shows 
that the wage distribution shifts downwards and returns to a position similar to that in Treat-
ment 1. Even though Treatment 1 and 5 are equivalent with respect to all parameters relevant 
to the negotiation (rent, outside options, minimum wage), the mean wage and the wage distri-
bution differ significantly between both treatments. This finding is supportive of the results of 
Falk et al. (2006), who also find that the wage increase occurring when a minimum wage is 
introduced is larger than the reduction in wages when this minimum wage is abolished. Our 
findings differ from those of Falk et al. (2006) in that we have the same subjects (although in 
different bargaining pairs) playing the entire sequence of the introduction and later elimina-Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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tion of the minimum wage. Falk et al. (2006) played two different treatments with different 
groups of subjects – one that started without a minimum wage but had it introduced halfway 
through the experiment, and another one that started with a minimum wage and abolished it 
later. Since subjects in our experiment could still remember how they behaved in Treatment 1 
when Treatment 5 starts, it does not come as a surprise that both treatments yield rather simi-
lar results. Nevertheless, the differences are large enough to be statistically significant. 
3.2  Is there a first-mover advantage? 
Our experimental bargaining game is set up in a way that is similar to a Rubinstein (1982) 
alternating-offers game; it gives an advantage to the party making the first offer. This first-
mover advantage does not play a role in the first two rounds of offers and counteroffers, be-
cause there is no risk that bargaining breaks down if the side receiving an offer does not ac-
cept it. Thus, there is no pressure on the bargaining parties to come to an agreement imme-
diately. Nevertheless, nothing prevents the bargainers from agreeing on an offer made in the 
first two rounds. In fact, we observe that about 8 percent of all agreements are struck in 
rounds 1 or 2.  
If a negotiation reaches round 3, it is again the side’s turn that had to make the very first 
offer. From this round on, however, the respective responder knows that rejecting an offer can 
lead to the breakdown of the negotiation with a probability of 20 percent, in which case each 
side receives only its outside option. Both bargainers have a mutual incentive to agree as 
quickly as possible to avoid the risk of losing their common rent. Rational bargaining should 
conclude immediately once the negotiation reaches round 3. In our experiment, 20 percent of 
all agreements were made in round 3. Only a fifth of all agreements were struck after round 5. 
As is well-known from the model of Rubinstein (1982), the threat of a random breakdown 
of the negotiation should the responder reject gives the proposer a first-mover advantage. The 
proposer can reduce his offer to the responder’s expected value from rejecting and making a 
counteroffer that the other side is willing to accept. In our experiment, this first-mover advan-
tage should result in lower bargained wages when an employer makes the first offer than in 
the cases where it is the employee’s turn to make the first move. Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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Table 3: First-mover advantage? 
    
Table 3 shows how bargained wages differ when employers or employees make the first 
offer. Except for Treatment 2, mean wages are always higher when employees make the first 
offer. The median wage differs only in Treatment 3, where it is also higher when the em-
ployee is the first mover. In most cases, the differences between mean wages and between 
wage distributions are not statistically significant. In the case where the t-test suggests that the 
means are statistically different, the Wilcoxon test does not produce sufficient evidence to 
reject the hypothesis that the distributions of wages are the same, and vice versa. Overall, 
these results suggest that the bargainers are not able to exploit a potential first-mover advan-
tage in our experiment. 
3.3  Minimum wages and initial offers 
To understand why even minimum wages that are far below actually observed wages affect 
the bargaining outcome, it is helpful to take a look at how both bargaining parties approach 
each other in the different treatments of our experiment. In the first two bargaining rounds of 
each period, neither party has to fear that a rejection of its offer or counteroffer leads to a 
breakdown of the negotiation. Hence, there is no pressure to make offers or counteroffers that 
are immediately acceptable to the other side. In our experiment, we observe that both parties 
use this opportunity to state claims that are substantially more favorable to them than the later 
bargaining outcome. Even the 90
th percentile of all wages offered by employers in the first 
round is lower than the median of eventual wage agreements. Similarly, the 10
th percentile of 
wages demanded by employees in their first offers is above the later median wage. Even 
though the wages stated in the first two rounds of each period are, in principle, of no imme-
mean median mean median
means 
(t-test; p-values)
distributions 
(Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
signed-ranks test; 
p-values)
1 - 123.9 130 125.1 130 0.71 0.97
2 70 130.2 130 129.7 130 0.79 0.10
3 95 132.9 135 137.4 140 0.08 0.45
4 160 169.7 170 171.1 170 0.11 0.31
5 - 127.6 130 129.8 130 0.28 0.49
Note: p-values are calculated with clustering at the individual ("employer") level (62 clusters).
significance of difference between
first mover = 
employer
first mover = 
employee
treatment
minimum 
wageSpillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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diate consequence for the bargainers’ choices in later rounds, we observe that the wages stated 
in the first two rounds fix the bounds of the wage interval in which both parties make mutual 
concessions in later rounds. In more than 90 percent of all cases, employers raise their subse-
quent offer compared to their previous bid and only in 3.6 percent of all cases do they reduce 
it. Likewise, employees reduced their previously demanded wage two rounds later in 85 per-
cent of all cases and increased it in only three percent of all offers. Only in five percent of all 
negotiations did one of the parties make a bid in later rounds that was outside the interval de-
marcated in the first two rounds. This suggests that the choice of first offers and counteroffers 
is informative about how both parties approach the negotiation and what they hope to get out 
of it. 
Table 4: Distribution of wages offered by employers in first round 
  
   
The distribution of wages offered in the first round when the employers start the negotia-
tion is summarized in Table 4. Compared to the results in Table 1, one sees that the first wage 
offers are substantially lower than eventual wage agreements. Even the 90
th percentile of 
wage offers is less than the eventual mean and median wage agreements. If we compare the 
different treatments, we see that the introduction and raises of the minimum wage shift the 
mean first offer upwards. Looking at the entire distribution, the shift in the mean wage offer 
seems to be driven by shifts at the lower end of the wage distribution. The lowest 25 percent 
10 25
50 
(median)
75 90
1 - 79.37 3.68 36 60 80 100 115.5
2 70 83.29 2.76 70 70 80 100 110
3 95 103.15 1.96 95 95 100 110 120
4 160 158.76 2.05 160 160 160 165 170
5 - 82.22 5.07 10 60 90 110 125
Note: standard errors clustered at the individual ("employer") level (62 clusters).
treatment
minimum 
wage
mean
s.e. of the 
mean
percentiles
(no further 
controls)
(controlling for 
individual fixed 
effects)
Treatment 1 = Treatment 2 0.247 0.392 0.227
Treatment 2 = Treatment 3 0.000 0.000 0.000
Treatment 3 = Treatment 4 0.000 0.000 0.000
Treatment 5 = Treatment 1 0.523 0.936 0.924
Note: p-values reported, clustering at the individual ("employer") level (62 clusters).
Hypothesis
t-test
Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-ranks testSpillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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of first wage offers in Treatment 1 were below 60, and thus also below the minimum wage in 
Treatment 2. When the minimum wage is introduced, the lower end of the distribution is 
pushed upwards towards the new minimum. One should keep in mind that the minimum wage 
applies only to eventual outcomes. There are no provisions that prevent employers’ to offer a 
wage below the minimum in intermediate bargaining rounds. In our experiment, 6.8 percent 
of first wage offers are below the minimum wage in Treatment 2. The shift in the distribution 
of first offers is, however, statistically insignificant. 
Increasing the minimum wage to 95 shifts the distribution of first offers even further up-
wards (Treatment 3). This increase in the minimum wage does not only affect the bottom of 
the distribution, but also shifts the upper part upwards. The change in the distribution is statis-
tically significant according to all three tests used. Increasing the minimum wage to 160 shifts 
the wage distribution further upwards. In Treatment 4, 65 percent of all initial wage offers are 
at exactly 160. Abolishing the minimum wage in Treatment 5 causes wage offers to fall sub-
stantially. The difference between the distributions of first offers in Treatments 1 and 5 is not 
statistically significant.  
Table 5: Distribution of wages demanded by employees in first round 
  
   
The wages demanded by employees when they can make the first offer do not appear to 
be affected by very low minimum wages. In most cases, mean wage demands and the distri-
bution of demanded wages do not exhibit statistically significant differences between Treat-
10 25
50 
(median)
75 90
1 - 171.48 3.26 140 150 175 190 200
2 70 171.10 3.17 140 150 170 190 200
3 95 167.66 2.99 140 150 170 180 200
4 160 190.35 2.03 175 180 189 200 200
5 - 168.63 3.19 143 150 170 180 200
Note: standard errors clustered at the individual ("employee") level (62 clusters).
treatment
minimum 
wage
mean
s.e. of the 
mean
percentiles
(no further controls)
(controlling for 
individual fixed effects)
Treatment 1 = Treatment 2 0.878 0.573 0.029
Treatment 2 = Treatment 3 0.140 0.453 0.150
Treatment 3 = Treatment 4 0.000 0.000 0.000
Treatment 5 = Treatment 1 0.444 0.552 0.296
Note: p-values reported, clustering at the individual ("employee") level (62 clusters).
Hypothesis
t-test
Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks testSpillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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ments 1, 2, 3, and 5. Only in Treatment 4, when the minimum wage is very high, do we ob-
serve that employees start off the negotiations with relatively high wage demands. This effect 
is mainly due to increasing wage demands at the bottom of the distribution. The top of the 
distribution of demanded wages does not change very much. 
A similar picture emerges when we look at the counteroffers made in round 2 (Table 6). 
Even though the initial wage demands of employees are not affected by the minimum wage, 
employers respond by making higher counteroffers in the presence of a  minimum wage. 
Again, this is mainly due to the necessity seen by employers to offer at least the minimum 
wage when making a counteroffer (less than 2 percent of the counteroffers are made below 
the minimum wage in Treatments 2-4). Round 2-counteroffers by employees do not seem to 
be affected by changes in the minimum wage, except for Treatment 4. If anything, the higher 
minimum wage and wage offers by employers in Treatment 3 even lead to a reduction of the 
wage demanded in the employees’ counteroffer.   
Table 6: Distribution of counteroffers in second round 
  
The reaction of employers’ and employees’ initial offers and counteroffers to the changes 
in the minimum wage suggests a specific channel through which minimum wages affect the 
wage bargain. Even a low minimum wage forces employers to start the negotiation off less 
aggressively because it effectively prohibits them from making very low initial offers. It does 
not seem to affect the initial demands raised by the employees. Hence, it increases only the 
10 25
50 
(median)
75 90
employers' counteroffers
1 - 90.19 4.23 50 70 90 110 130
2 70 97.15 3.10 70 80 100 115 130
3 95 112.47 2.45 95 100 110 125 140
4 160 164.56 0.74 160 160 165 170 170
5 - 99.80 4.49 50 80 100 122 140
employees' counteroffers
1 - 161.08 2.68 130 147 160 180 190
2 70 162.71 3.00 130 150 160 180 190
3 95 158.55 2.33 130 145 160 170 180
4 160 187.92 2.38 170 180 185 190 210
5 - 158.35 2.75 130 150 155 175 185
Note: standard errors clustered at the individual level (62 clusters).
treatment
minimum 
wage
mean
s.e. of the 
mean
percentilesSpillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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lower end of the wage interval demarcated by the first offer-counteroffer-combination. Both 
bargaining parties then start a process of making mutual concessions. Since the minimum 
wage forces employers to start at a position less favorable to them, the bargaining process 
converges towards higher wages. Even if the minimum wage in Treatments 2 and 3 lies far 
below most wage agreements observed in Treatment 1, the minimum wage forces employers 
to start approaching employees’ wage demands from a higher wage level, thus ending up at 
higher bargained wages. In Treatment 4, the relatively high minimum wage of 160 means that 
employers have to start making concessions at this wage level. In the end, most wages are 
agreed upon at levels strictly above 160. This process of making mutual concessions starting 
at one’s most desired wage level could explain why minimum wages lead to spillover effects 
if wages are bargained over. In the next section, we will discuss how this reasoning can be 
captured by theoretical wage bargaining models. 
4.  Comparison to theoretical bargaining solutions 
4.1  Theoretical considerations 
We consider two players,  { } 1,2 j = , who bargain over the partition of a rent. To analyze wage 
negotiations between firms and workers under the presence of minimum wages, we assume 
the two players to be a worker ( ) 1 j = and a firm ( ) 2 j = . If there is a bargaining agreement, 
the firm-worker pair produces some output good which generates revenue R. This revenue is 
split between the firm and the worker, where the worker’s share is the wage s1 and the firm’s 
share is the profit s2 = R – s1. If no bargaining agreement is reached, the worker and the firm 
obtain their disagreement payoffs d1 and d2, respectively. 
The Nash bargaining solution 
We first analyze the bargaining outcome of the Nash solution. Nash (1950) specifies four 
axioms: Pareto efficiency, invariance to equivalent utility representations, symmetry, and in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives. Nash shows that there is precisely one bargaining solu-
tion satisfying these axioms. It is described by 
  ( )( )
12
112 2 12 , max s.t.
ss S sdsd ss R
∈ Ω= − − + ≤ ,  (1) 
where Ω is the value of the Nash product. From the maximization problem (1), we obtain  Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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  ( ) 12
1
2
Nash
jj s d Rd d =+ −− .  (2) 
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution 
The plausibility of Nash’s IIA axiom has received some criticism (Luce and Raiffa 1957). 
This controversial axiom states that eliminating some apparently irrelevant alternatives should 
not change the point picked out by the solution function. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) re-
place this axiom with the property of individual monotonicity. This axiom implies that the 
players must not suffer from an enlargement of the bargaining set that leaves the maximum 
utilities attainable by both players unchanged. The KS solution consists of equalizing the 
players’ relative sacrifice of their maximum payoff in excess of their disagreement payoff. It 
can be described by the so-called KS curve  
 
11 22
**
1122
,
sd sd
sd sd
−−
=
−−
  (3) 
where 
*
j s  denotes the bliss point. The bliss point is the vector of the largest payoffs each play-
er could obtain, given that the other player receives at least his disagreement payoff. It is easy 
to see that the respective bliss points are given by 
*
12 s Rd = − and 
*
21 s Rd = −. Solving (3) for 
the optimal payoffs, subject to the constraint  12 ss R +≤, yields 
 
( ) 12
1
2
KS
jj s d Rd d =+ −−
.  (4) 
In this simple model, the KS solution (4) is equivalent to the Nash solution (2). This equiva-
lence arises from the assumption of risk-neutral players but does not hold for a more general 
utility function.  
The effects of a minimum wage 
We now turn to the analysis how a non-binding minimum wage affects the bargaining out-
comes in both the Nash and the KS solution. A minimum wage is not binding if it does not 
exceed the previously bargained wage. In the Nash solution, even a non-binding minimum 
wage reduces the bargaining set by making a range of low wages legally unattainable. How-
ever, the initial bargaining outcome remains part of the bargaining set. Hence, the reduction of 
the bargaining set has no impact on the bargaining outcome.  Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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The KS solution implies that both players agree on a wage that equalizes their relative 
payoff gains. These gains are given by the ratio of the actual gain to the maximum feasible 
gain, where the maximum is defined by the payoff each player can secure by pushing the oth-
er player to the minimum it would just be willing (or allowed) to accept. If a non-binding 
minimum wage is introduced which exceeds the worker’s disagreement payoff, the firm’s 
bliss point will be reduced. The best the firm can achieve now would be to push the wage 
down to its legal minimum. This reduction of the firm’s bliss point raises the bargained wage. 
Therefore, it is straightforward that the KS solution is menu dependent. A change in the 
choices available to the two players that does not affect their ability to choose their original 
agreement causes a shift in the bargaining outcome. 
Figure 2 illustrates this effect. The payoff frontier (PF) defines the boundary of the bar-
gaining set. Without a minimum wage, the Nash bargaining solution is at the point where the 
highest iso-Nash-curve is tangent to the PF (point A). The KS solution is given by the inter-
section of the PF and the line which connects the bliss point s
* and the disagreement point d. 
Given our simple model assumptions, the solution in the absence of minimum wages is in 
point A as well. The introduction of a minimum wage  11
min sd >  cuts off a segment of the PF 
(dotted). In the Nash solution, this reduction of the bargaining set has no effect on the bar-
gaining outcome due to the IIA axiom. In the KS solution, however, the minimum wage shifts 
the firm’s bliss point to the left. Since the disagreement point stays unchanged, this causes a 
rotation of the KS curve. The bargaining outcome shifts from A to B, which leads to an in-
crease in the worker’s wage.  Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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Figure 2: The Nash and the KS bargaining solution 
R
d
B
s*
A Ω=const.
s1
s2
d1
d2
s1min
s1 *
s2 * s2 *
PF
 
4.2  Experimental evidence 
In our experimental setup, it is easy to calculate the bargaining outcome predicted by the 
Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions (Table 7). Both bargaining solutions yield 
the same outcome when there is no minimum wage. Minimum wages at or below 95 do not 
affect the Nash solution, but do increase the outcome of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining 
solution. The relatively high minimum wage of 160 constitutes a binding constraint on the 
Nash solution, so it predicts a wage agreement of 160. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution pre-
dicts that the bargained wage should be strictly greater than the minimum wage even if it is at 
this high level. Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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Table 7: Theoretical and experimental bargaining outcomes 
treatment 
minimum 
wage 
Nash solution 
Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution 
experimental outcome 
(95%-confidence interval) 
1  -  95  95 
124.40 
(120.40; 128.40) 
2  70  95  116.45 
129.93 
(125.65; 134.21) 
3  95  95  126.67 
134.47 
(130.77; 138.16) 
4  160  160  164.09 
170.43 
(169.27; 171.60) 
5  -  95  95 
128.68 
(124.22; 133.14) 
Note: standard errors clustered at the individual level (62 clusters). 
Table 7 gives us two important insights. The first insight is that the Kalai-Smododinsky 
solution provides a better qualitative description of the actually observed behavior in our ex-
periment than the Nash solution. Rising minimum wages always increase the bargaining out-
come of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, which also predicts that the high minimum wage 
should not be binding ex post. This corresponds exactly to what we observe in the experiment. 
The Nash solution is unable to explain the positive wage effect from low minimum wages. 
Neither solution can provide a perfect prediction of the bargaining outcome. Even though 
the predictions derived from the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are closer to observed behavior 
than those from the Nash solution, both predictions are outside the confidence interval of 
mean wages in all treatments of our experiment. Both theoretical bargaining solutions predict 
wages that are too low compared to our experimental bargaining outcomes. Thus, our experi-
ment cannot resolve the question which theoretical bargaining solution provides an adequate 
description of real-life bargaining behavior. 
5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we have examined the effects of a minimum wage when wages are bar-
gained over between a worker and a firm. We reported the results of a laboratory experiment 
in which a minimum wage is first introduced and later increased. Our experimental results 
broadly confirm the stylized facts of spillover effects from the empirical literature: 1) the 
wage of workers that used to earn less than the new minimum wage rises above the minimum 
level, and 2) a minimum wage increases the wage of workers already earning a wage above Spillover effects of minimum wages: Theory and experimental evidence 
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the new minimum wage. These results suggest that spillover effects of minimum wages also 
occur in labor markets that cannot be described by standard wage hierarchy or effort provi-
sion.  
Moreover, we have compared our experimental findings with the prediction from theoreti-
cal bargaining models. While the Nash solution cannot explain the existence of spillover ef-
fects, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields results that are qualitatively similar to our expe-
rimental findings. A minimum wage, even if it is less than a worker’s current wage, reduces 
the maximum payoff a firm could hope to obtain if it succeeded to reduce the worker’s payoff 
as much as possible. In the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, this weakens the firm’s 
bargaining position and leads to higher wages. Even though the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 
is able to explain the existence of spillover effects of minimum wages, wages actually ob-
served in our bargaining experiment differ substantially from the predictions of the Kalai-
Smordinsky solution. Hence, neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are able 
to provide a perfect description of observed bargaining behavior.  
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Regression results 
  
Bargaining outcome
(Table 2)
first-mover: employer
first-round wage offer
(Table 4)
first-mover: employee
first-round wage demand
(Table 5)
Treatment 1 (no minimum wage) reference reference reference
Treatment 2 (MW = 70) 4.29** 2.99 -1.47
(2.11) (3.47) (2.60)
Treatment 3 (MW = 95) 8.26*** 22.18*** -3.49
(2.15) (3.81) (3.41)
Treatment 4 (MW = 160) 45.10*** 76.93*** 18.48***
(2.23) (4.53) (4.13)
Treatment 5 (no minimum wage) 2.84 0.34 -2.46
(2.03) (4.23) (4.10)
Indiv. fixed effects yes yes yes
Number of observations 838 542 535
Number of clusters 62 62 62
R
2
0.76 0.78 0.57
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the individual level); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1